



doi <https://doi.org/10.58256/458n4t92>

Research Article

Section: Politics & International Relations



Published in Nairobi, Kenya
by Royallite Global.

Volume 8, Issue 1, 2024



Article Information

Submitted: 15th April 2024

Accepted: 6th June 2024

Published: 12th July 2024

Additional information is
available at the end of the
article

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

ISSN: 2520-4009 (Print)

ISSN: 2523-0948 (Online)

To read the paper online,
please scan this QR code



How to Cite:

Agumba, W. M., & Mwatela, R. Z. (2024). Analysis into the influence of violent extremism financing in Kenya's defence policy with Somali from 2002- 2022. *Nairobi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 8(1). <https://doi.org/10.58256/458n4t92>



Analysis into the influence of violent extremism financing in Kenya's defence policy with Somali from 2002 to 2022

Wellingtone Mayo Agumba¹ & Raphael Ziro Mwatela²

¹Department of Humanities and Languages, Mount Kenya University, Kenya

²Department of Social Sciences, Pwani University, Kenya

Correspondence: nelly.wellingtone@gmail.com

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8054-5144>

Abstract

Following the increasing violent extremism attacks by the Al-Shabab, Kenya citing Article 52 of the UN charter started a military operation in Somalia dubbed "Linda Nchi. Before October, 12, 2011 the Kenya Defence Forces had never gone on an offensive missions except for the usual UN Peace keeping mandates. This was a major foreign policy shift by the government to protect her citizens. This was however followed by, building of Kenya-Somalia border wall, and closing down of Daadab refugee camp all aimed at targeting violent extremist's sources of finance, thus the justification of the study, analysis into the influence of violent extremism financing in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia from 2002 to 2022. The research objective was: How violent extremism financing has influenced Kenya's defence policy with Somalia. Study site was Nairobi with the target population of: Kenya Defence Forces, National Counter Terrorism Centre, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Department of Immigration officials. Sampling was through purposive and simple random sampling methods, instrument was questionnaire forms. The study established that, Kenya's defence policy with Somalia was influenced by: violent extremism financing in the period under review. The research recommended that: The Kenya and Somalia governments should work together in targeting and freezing of assets of Al-Shabaab: The public-private partnerships in countering financing of terrorism should be encouraged in both countries: Kenya-Somalia border, needs around the clock monitoring to safeguard and discourage the proliferation of illegal goods such as sugar, milk etc. whose proceeds can't be traced or accounted for hence end up being laundered and financing violent extremism. Financial Intelligence Gathering and Analysis should be done by Kenya and Somalia to monitor transactions and discourage violent extremism financing: There is need for constant patrols in the national parks and wildlife conservancies to preserve wild animals from sophisticated poachers looking for game treasures like elephant tusks, pangolin, and game meat.

Keywords: defence policy, violent extremism financing, Kenya Defence Forces, Hawala, Violent Extremist Group

© 2024 The Author(s). This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY-NC-SA) license.

Introduction

Violent extremist financing (VEF) as a term is formed of two elements, the first being 'violent extremism' and the second 'financing'. The phrase has been dissected many times in the academic literature with no one clear definition being presented. In the research completed by Clarion, it was stated that the traditional understanding of violent extremism is to name 'an individual or group that uses ideology as a religious or political vehicle to implement change using means which go beyond the current rule of law and human rights standards. Despite the increased focus on the funds movements, it is important to note that terrorism financing involves the raising of funds, whether they are raised through legal means and then diverted to terrorist activities, or whether they are obtained through illicit methods such as smuggling and fraud. As is often the case in identifying and defining criminal activity, distinguishing between violent extremist financing and other types of funding for legitimate opposition movements or non-violent activities can be very difficult. It can also be difficult to distinguish between legal activities and illegal activities of violent extremist groups, and in some cases violent extremist groups have been known to engage in legitimate business to fund illegal activities. An understanding of the nature of VE financing is important because there is a common misperception that the financial activities of violent extremist groups are entirely illegal, and that they only engage in smuggling, counterfeiting, or other criminal activity as a means to an end. While many VE groups do finance a portion of their activities through criminal activity, it is often the case that activities which are deemed to be legal under the laws of the states in which they occur still contribute significantly to VE group finances.

It was not until October 2001 that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental organization founded for the purpose of developing and promoting policies to combat money laundering, defined terrorist financing with its "Special Recommendation on Terrorist Financing". This was the first official attempt at differentiating the financing activities of terrorist organizations from that of legitimate organizations, and it seeks to illustrate that terrorism financing is a special case of money laundering. This is due to the fact that it involves money that is used for an illegal purpose that may or may not be sourced from an illegal activity. In this case, the money is used to support terrorist activity, which is drastically different from money that is laundered from an illegal activity to give it the appearance of legitimate funds.

On the other hand, defence Policy is the response or the conscious plan of actions chosen by an individual or group to deal with specific problems. In any community, the policy made is to ensure their survival and well-being to achieve their goals. Countries or nation-states have for long time come up with, long or short term external policies and strategies to curb such cases (defence policies). Defence policy itself is a plan which covers the entire aspects of defence preparedness against the threats to the security and survival of the things unwanted and harmful. They are driven by the view that capabilities and resources are not ends in themselves, but are valuable only as ways of dealing with challenges.

Thus, defence policy becomes so important in a country because it is flexible and always changes according to the environment at the time. This is because the policy is influenced by many factors within or outside of the country concerned. Some of these policies are formalized and there are also only planning it. But both of these equally have clear objectives for the well-being and survival of a nation. A strong and well integrated defence policy where all elements of state power are coordinated and harmonized to support national objectives is crucial to the security and development of any nation. "The first task of any state is to ensure the safety of life and property of its citizens". It is imperative for states to design ways and conceive of means through which their interests can effectively be secured. This explains why "the issue of national security cannot be taken for granted by any state" (Mbachu, 1998). In the absence of challenges, such policies, and resources allocation can be reduced to the point where they no longer impose an intolerable burden on the society.

This implies that, it is formulated through a process that has considerations like political and other implications in mind. In the case of at least democratically oriented nations, defence policy is most often referred to the civilian ministry or agency of government (i.e., The Ministry of Defence) for formulation and implementation. With the Kenya's new constitution has changed the policy tool from regime centred security policy to citizen-centred security service provision. Given this, our definition of public policy is, a

purposive and consistent course of action produced as a response to a perceived problem of a constituency, formulated by a specific political process, and adopted, implemented, and enforced by a public agency.

It is evident that violent extremism is not a phenomenon that can be eradicated overnight. This understanding has significantly influenced the frames of reference for policy makers in addressing the importance of the violent extremism financing in defence policy and strategies. Therefore the most difficult challenge for policy makers seeking to reduce the incidence of violent extremism, primarily due to the private and non-state nature of the activity. With this distinction from legitimate forms of finance conducted by armed groups and organizations involved in conflict the policy makers can easily come up with proper mechanisms to deal with violent extremism. According to researchers on terrorism financing, it is essential to create a well-prepared defence policy in order to cut off the sources of funding for violent extremism. This point is rooted in the belief that if an innovation is too radical to be capable of independently sustaining itself financially, it will die out. Furthermore, even though the amount of money required to sustain an innovative radical movement is relatively low in comparison to other forms of armed conflict, money is the lifeblood of the organization and without it, the movement will perish.

Background of the Study.

The events of September 11, 2001 led to a rapid expansion in the body of research on terrorism and an equally rapid growth of that research funding. Violent extremism has emerged as one of the most daunting security threats at the global level. With terrorism increasingly being recognized as a tactic utilized in pursuit of a range of other objectives rather than an end in itself, the financing of violent extremist groups has become a topic of growing interest. Violent extremism is a complex thematic issue that has many underlying causes, including poverty, inequality, and political instability. It has been determined that the majority of terrorist acts are carried out in order to further a particular political, nationalistic, or ideological cause. Often such causes are a manifestation of grievances held by specific groups or by an entire community. Alexander. The nation-states have come up with defence policy to reduce acts of violent extremism. The best defence policy strategy is one that will manage to erode the funding sources for the particular movement in question. Yet in order to do this, the policy maker requires an understanding of the different methods that radical groups employ to finance their activities, whether they are drawing this money from domestic or international sources, the cost of terrorism and how these costs can be disrupted

Internationally, the European Union (EU) has been an important target for international terrorist organizations, the Madrid Bombing and London train station incidents. Many research have suggested that, due to this, the EU has aggressively revised and improved its international and internal policies to provide tighter anti-violent extremism financing regulations. The EU has introduced and implemented an extensive array of measures to supplement and strengthen its laws and policies in order to eliminate or make it extremely difficult for terrorists and their supporters to engage in activities that promote terror financing. In June 2018, the Council of the European Union changed its anti-money laundering policy, for example, by reinforcing the authority of financial supervision authorities to improve their access to and exchange of information on customers and transactions between them and commercial banks. The Commission's mandate to maintain a list of non-EU countries deemed risky due to shortcomings in their anti-money laundering prevention regimes countries like Ghana, Syria, and Afghanistan, among others. More importantly to demand that financial transactions with these countries be subjected to additional scrutiny is another policy shift that has been influenced by the financing of terrorism. The fifth anti-money laundering directive (EU) 2018/843 and the directive (EU) 2015/849 contain these policy transfers, which are intended to strengthen oversight of third countries the Commission deems risky and to make it more difficult for supporters and accomplices of violent extremism to hide illicit cash behind fictitious corporate firms (Bloemkolk, 2015). The ultimate objective is to address VE financing in order to defeat VE.

The United States of America has also been a country of target by the VEG world over. At home there has been cases of home-grown incidences and in her interests overseas, like in the Middle East and, Africa there has been targeted attacks by the Al-Qaida and ISIS the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Tanzania in 1998. As the number one target for terrorists, along with its Western counterparts, the US authority is

constantly modifying its policy approaches in order to protect itself and its allies against terror strikes. According to prior research findings, violent extremism financing is one of the main concerns that the United States intends to address. The US government, working closely with other nation-states' parliaments and judicial institutions, has had to devise means of blocking violent extremism funding by making stringent measures to seal the loopholes that can be used by any VEG acquire cash or material support.

Utilizing multilateral coalitions, the United States has partnered with a various allies in the GWT. The US federal government has in the past backed and offered countries along with other world bodies with policy and strategies of tracing funds for VEGs. They have also assisted with relevant data and assessments to assist them in the fight against violent extremism financing. Other changes to policies in the United States to impede and prevent violent extremism financing include the blocking of suspected terrorists' financial accounts during investigations. A fact deemed by many human rights activist as 'anti-due process' as it violates the right to be deemed innocent unless proven otherwise (Rollins & Wyler, 2013).

The best example of the US sanction regime to states are: the Lockerbie (Scotland) incident, where Libya was adversely mentioned as the perpetrator of downing of a plane killing all passengers and the US designated Libya and her leader Mummer Gaddafi as terror sponsor. This led to frosty relations between Libya and the United States. Sanctions and embargos were imposed on Libya as a result. (Sule, 2021). Diplomatic relations between the USA and her Western allies towards Libya was suspended. Another incident was in 1993, when the Republic of Sudan was diplomatically isolated by the US while citing cases of sponsoring terrorist activities. Osama Bin- Laden and his crew were training and planning their activities inside Sudan. This was further complicated as some factories in Sudan designated for fertilizer production started manufacturing chemicals for making bombs. This led to the suspension of ties with Sudan in 1996 and the closing of her embassy in Khartoum. Sudan was marooned, sanctioned and could not operate effectively in the international arena, this was later reversed after Sudan paid penalties to the US (Bearak & Mohieddin, 2020; Ambeyi, 2021). All these were cases of shift in policy due to VE financing.

After the 9/11, the prosecutor in the United States while hunting for Osama Bin Laden, noted that, apart from being the mastermind of all the attacks on America's soil, he was also the sponsor of the attacks, having donated USD 250 million to the terrorist outfit (Ivancovich, 2015). This led to bounty being placed on his head, as manhunt internationally was on going. Any state that aided or helped him in anyway way was considered the enemy of the GWT hence the famous phrase by G.W. Bush " if you are not with us then you are against us" Countries like Afghanistan was labelled terrorist state with Taliban being terrorist regime. The US invaded Afghanistan to flash out the Taliban regime which offered Osama sanctuary, it's worth noting that Afghanistan was a long standing US ally of the. The US offered Afghanistan weapons and technical support during the Russia-Afghan war in the 80s. This was the first time the United States of America was invading a state on the mantra of " war against terror campaign" but also a policy shift on one of her former ally.

In Africa, countries are susceptible to the Money Laundering Act, drug trafficking, and terrorist attacks from various VEGs. This is very evident in countries like Mali, Chad, and the Central African Republic which are in protracted conflict with such groups. According to Abraham & Hoffman (2017) and Sesay (2019). The countries most affected by terrorist attacks are those that terrorist organizations view as pro-Western allies in the GWT. According to Dingji et al, (2020), the majority of these attacks are carried out by terrorists from nearby countries who receive material and financial support from the parent terror cell to which they are affiliated. In certain cases, they also receive support from sympathizers within the attacked countries or from nearby countries. West Africa's power house, Nigeria and Cameroon have had their fair share of violent extremism from the Boko Haram. Nigeria and Cameroon have been immortal rivals dating back to the 1960s, this has further been compounded by the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula which both countries lay claim. Apart from the kidnappings like the, 200 Chibok girls and Dapchi girls in 2017 incidents where Boko Haram made headlines and a fortune as the government had to pay for the release of the girls. They also get their funds through bank robberies, cybercrimes, extortion, and illegal money services. (Abraham, 2020). In a turn of events, the inroads made by Boko Haram in both countries has brought a unity of purpose, where Nigeria and Cameroon work together to trace, track and profile

legal businesses and other sources of finance for the VEG. These groups cross the international borders, mingling with the general population making it very difficult to identify and weed them out. The only way to eradicate them is to go after their sources of finance. This is through joint border control, joint military operations hence improved diplomatic relations.

In the Horn of Africa region, Ethiopia and Sudan had frosty relations with terrorism financing taking centre stage. The regime of former Sudan president Mr Omar Al-Bashir was being blamed for sponsoring, giving training ground and safe protection to terrorist organizations that were disturbing the peace and security in the region: A case being that of Osama Bin Laden from 1991–1996. (Duursma & Muller, 2019). A number of countries led anti-Sudan campaign through their policies. Uganda claimed financial and material support was being extended to the Lord Resistance Army Rebels. Ethiopia claimed financial as well as sanctuary was offered to the Islamic Front for the Oromo, and Eritrea claimed financial as well as military support was being offered to the Islamic Jihad, which was carrying out terror activities inside Eritrea. Using this as impetus, the Omar Al-Bashir rule was marred by allegations and was isolated diplomatically by many states as they withdrew their diplomatic relations.

Kenya's geographical position as a gateway to the East African region made it particularly vulnerable to the financing of violent extremism. In Kenya, terrorist financing has played a significant role in enabling and facilitating other terrorist-related activities in Kenya. Kenya has been subjected to terrorist attacks at the hands of Al Qaeda and their associate group Al Shabaab since the late 1990s, with the aim of implementation of their concept of 'violent Jihad' (Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, 2013, p. 10).

Before, there was absence of a financial intelligence unit in Kenya, this contributed to illegal cash transfers. Goldberg, (2015). Kenya had a good proportion of threats from various terror groups: transnational organized crime, terrorism in its various forms, human trafficking, and money laundering, the consequences of which are far-reaching. Osman Through this, a large amount of money is generated for violent extremist activities. Al Shabaab in Somalia abusing remittance companies by wiring large sums of money that local officials cannot track, which is used to sponsor their terror acts even in Kenya and Uganda. As such, Kenya was listed as a key money laundering destination by a US report, which castigated the inadequacy of the Kenyan government to oversee financial transfers that are often mired with corruption and illegal trading. According to Cauderwood (2014), it was unearthed that Kenya was supporting the terror activities of the militant group through its sugar importation. It is critical to recall that piracy on the Kenyan-Somalia coast was financially rewarding for Somalia-based and other international terrorists too. The use of cashless money like crypto currency from all over the world to finance violent extremism also posed difficulty to the security personnel before the VEG executed their attack, some bogus NGOs, were indicted for receiving funds in the name of charity work but diverted them to fund violent extremism in Kenya. The country had faced numerous attacks from extremist groups, and disrupting their sources of funding was crucial to prevent further destabilization. In response to this threat, Kenya has implemented a multifaceted approach to counter violent extremism financing.

As one of the responses Kenya took in order to bolster her defence capabilities at the time. The Kenya's defence Policy had three core aims of 1) Protecting Kenya from external aggression 2) advancing her interests in Regional Security, and 3) Undertaking Peace Support Operations are very much in line with the threats that faced the nation. What was labelled in the Defence Policy of 1999 as 'manned retaliation' (Ruteere et al, 2016). This changed due to constant attacks by the Al-Shabaab and the KDF's armed incursion into Somalia in 2011 citing it as an act of self-defence. The document then goes on to explain that under the National Security Policy and Internal Security Strategy KDF's role has been that of support for civil authorities, especially in the restoration and maintenance of law and order. This was to reach its apex with Operation Linda Nchi whose main goal was to create a safe and secure environment in Kenya free from Al Shabaab threats and attacks. Operation Linda Nchi has however been criticised for failing to fully meet its goal due to the numerous terror attacks in Kenya since the operation, and the fact that Al Shabaab has claimed that Kenya's military endeavours are the reason for the attacks on Kenyan soil (BBC, 2016). The 2017 Defence Policy, with special focus on PCVE, is thus a direct response to these criticisms and the failure

of previous policy strategies to achieve the goal of preventing external aggression and threat to Kenya's security from Al Shabaab.

The adoption and implementation of the global legal framework against terrorism financing has presented a watershed moment in preventing and combating terrorism financing. Kenya started the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC). It enacted, the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA) 2009, later partnering with international organizations like the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and UNODC. This enabled Kenya partnership with other nations like South Africa. This included strengthening financial regulations to enhance transparency and prevent illicit flows of funds. Additionally, the government intensified efforts to collaborate with international partners and regional organizations to track and disrupt the channels used for financing violent extremism

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of violent extremism financing in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia. This is a topic which thus far has received little attention despite the fact that defence is essentially the protection of state or group interests from security threats, and the vast majority of research on the causes and prevention of violent extremism has been policy driven.

Problem Statement

Kenya and Somalia have established diplomatic relations over time, signing various socio-economic and political agreements. Kenya's foreign policy is defined as one based on the concept of not intervening in the internal affairs of other nations. Peace building, peace-making, and commitment to regional as well as international organizations. It mediated the Somalia national reconciliation conference in Eldoret-Nairobi-Mbagathi under the guidance of IGAD, which undoubtedly shaped the future Kenya-Somalia ties. Since 1991 Kenya has been the host to refugees fleeing from the ever continuous conflicts in Somalia. These refugees were given shelter in Dadaab refugee camps deep inside Kenya's territory. (Osman, 2016). After America's 9/11 and later the war on terror, violent extremist threats have spread throughout the entire globe. Despite numerous international and national counter-violent extremism measures and approaches being put in place, very little has been gained against the glaring threat. (Muller, 2020; Morema, 2020). In Kenya, the Al-Shabaab menace has resulted in socioeconomic effects throughout the country, including cross-border attacks, shootings, and bombings in shopping malls, schools, churches, aid workers, and tourists. All these were made possible due to steady finances coming from various sources including charcoal trade, extortion of traders, kidnappings. It is the rise of Al-Shabaab and frequent attacks, especially in the North-Eastern, Nairobi, and Mombasa regions, that triggered a series of Kenya's defence strategies. The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) special operation in Somalia in 2011 (Linda Nchi), which also marked the first time since independence that the KDF engaged in combat on foreign soil. Kenya went ahead to close down the border with Somalia and build a Kenya-Somalia border wall stretching from Manderu to Kiunga. (Mutisya, 2017). Closing down Dadaab refugee camps and eventually repatriating all the refugees back to Somalia (Agwanda, 2022). These were aimed at countering entry of people, goods and services into Kenya where they often sell their goods and profit goes back to Somalia to fund Violent Extremism Group. All these moves by the Kenyan government were considered serious diplomatic gestures that affected her relations with Somalia, thus the justification of the study to analyse the role of finance in the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia from 2002–2022.

Research Questions

- i. To establish the sources of finance of violent extremism group, Al-Shabaab from 2002 to 2022
- ii. To analyse the role of violent extremism financing in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia from 2002-2022.

Significance of Study

The research findings will benefit a variety of stakeholders, including: the government to highlight some of the critical areas that will improve positive trans-border relations with other nation states. Moreover, it will

help in the restoration of strain relations between the countries under consideration, as well as promotion of peaceful coexistence among the communities living in the region under review. It will help in eradicating legitimate businesses and illegal businesses that finance violent extremist groups. They can also get a picture of the significance of AML/CFT in the national security context. This paper can also be used as a reference and guidance for all related parties dealing with violent extremism and AML/CFT issues. This is because there are also recommendations addressed to them on their efforts to support national security and to make the world safe from terrorism and violent extremism. The study will help the local citizens understand the shifts in the foreign policy of Kenya and appreciate why they had to be done and what the influences or triggers were for the shifts. The scholars consolidate much-needed knowledge, which may have an impact on students studying international relations. Furthermore, it will contribute significantly to analytical skills and further research on how violent extremism affect various parts of the country, region and internationally. The study provides much-needed information on international relations between Kenya and Somalia, and how violent extremism has tested the long-standing relations between these two neighbours. It is an addition to the written sources of violent extremism and international relations to the Mount Kenya University.

Geographical Scope

This study was conducted in Nairobi because it is the capital city and has all of the relevant offices. The researcher gathered data and conducted interviews with representatives of Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya Defence Forces, National Counter Terrorism Centre and immigration officials.

Chronological Scope

The study was limited to the period from 2002 to 2022. Within this time frame, there were active violent extremism activities within the Kenyan borders and her interests. During this time, there were concerted efforts from all stakeholders who were keen on eradicating the vice of violent extremism, an idea which was foreign to Kenya at the time. This also saw the formulation of policies aimed at stopping the constant attacks, defence policies, and measures to prevent future attacks.

Limitations of the study

The research was conducted in Nairobi by gathering data from a male-dominated respondent group. The study was unable to meet a 50% gender balance rule, which would have been better to have equal or dissenting views from either side. This was in line with the Kenyan government's affirmative action on gender rule. The study gathered data from 36.46% female and 63.54% male. This was necessitated by the fact that some women were on maternity leave and some on annual leave and couldn't be found to help with the research.

Research Methodology

This section contains the framework for, research design, target population, study location, sampling procedure, sample size, sample distribution, data collection instruments, data collection procedure, Testing for validity and reliability of the instruments, data analysis procedure, and lastly ethical consideration of the study.

Research Design

This study used descriptive research design as it used primary data / qualitative techniques to solve the problem, this was also chosen to help the researcher accurately bring the perspective of the respondents without leaving some of their valuable responses to as it required deep and critical analysis to bring out the correct possible results needed. This is well suiting the assessment of violent extremism and how deep it has influenced the Kenya's defence policy with Somalia.

Location of the Study

The study site was Nairobi City, the capital and administrative headquarters of the Republic of Kenya. The country Kenya is located in the Eastern Africa region and by extension forming part of the Horn of Africa. With a population of 47.6 million according to the 2019 population census, and more than 42 ethnic groups. Kenya shares border with Somalia to the east, Ethiopia to the north, Uganda to the west and Tanzania to the South. The choice of Nairobi was informed by the fact that it is the capital and the administrative city of Kenya therefore all the department which formed part of the respondents are all based there.

Target population

The research involved the following state agencies, National Counter Terrorism Centre, Immigration Officials, Department of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these actors were selected because of their daily policy formulation work and dealing in one way or the other with issues of security of the state. This entails research in violent extremism, combating such vice and coming up with various policies which help in the defence of Kenya against external forces.

Table 1: Target Population

Target Population	Frequency
National Counter Terrorism Centre	1,300
Immigration Officials	800
Department of Defence	7,000
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1,000
Total	10.100

Source: Department of Defence, 2023, State Department of Interior and Coordination of National Government, 2023, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023

Sample and Sampling procedures

This sections gives an outlook of sample size, procedures and techniques used in sampling by the researcher. The method used in research were purposive and simple random sampling. This methods were used to ensure fair chances for all target population and to eradicate the chances of biasness in the survey. Purposive sampling technique was used identify 20 key informers from all the target departments in the research. Some of the questions needed very sensitive answers which the general questionnaire couldn't capture. This could only incorporate the views of very few individual within these targeted departments who had deep understanding and perfect knowledge of security, defence foreign policy and violent extremism in Kenya during the time under review. This was used to identify and interview higher management of various departments involved. Simple random sampling was used for respondents who had to fill the questionnaire forms as a requirement for this survey, it used for the 364 respondents.

Sample size

The research involved the following state agencies, National Counter Terrorism Centre, Immigration, Department of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Officials All dealing in one way or the other with issues of security of the state. The respondents in this study were determined and derived at by the Andrew Fisher formulae (1981), where the population was greater than 10,000 to participate in this research. Where:

N =Target population is greater than 10,000

Z = Normal deviation at the desired confidence level (95%)

Z value at 95% is 1.96

N = percentage of people who have the desired trait

Confidence Interval was taken to be $\pm 5\%$. Since the proportion of the population with the characteristic is not known.

$$\text{Sample size} = \frac{(1.96)^2 \times 0.5(0.5)}{(0.5)^2}$$

Sample size = 384

Table 2: Respondent’s Sample Distribution

Target Population	Number of Respondents	(%) of Respondents	Sampling Technique
National Counter Terrorism Centre	60	15.6	Purposive and simple random sampling
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	137	35.7	Simple Random Sampling and Purposive
Kenya Defence Forces	137	35.7	Simple Random Sampling and Purposive
Immigration Officials	50	13.0	Purposive and simple random sampling
Total	384	100	

Source: Author (2023)

The researcher used purposive and simple random sampling techniques in the study in all the listed target population in the table 2. As shown above.

Data Collection Instruments

Questionnaire forms

Primary data was collected by administering the questionnaire to the sample population, the questionnaire consisted of a set of questions put together in order in forms which was administered by the researcher to the sample population. The close ended questionnaire was preferred, this acted as guiding point for the interviewer to help the respondents stay in the correct trail of thought and relevance in the research. These forms empowered the respondents to stay focused on the subject matter and address the examination specifically. The questionnaire had both open and closed questions focusing on the dependent and independent variables. Open ended helped in capturing ideas which were not known to the researcher or included in the line of questioning. The primary rationale for selecting a questionnaire was that it can be administered to a very large audience within the shortest time frame visa vie the other methods of data collection methods. The questionnaire was divided into segments, Designation, level of education, department of the respondent general questions of the subject matter, all questions formulated by the researcher.

Data Collection methods and procedures

It entails collecting data from the sample in order to answer the research questions. The research fully depended on the questionnaire as the sole instrument for data collection. The questionnaire form schedule was developed for all the targeted respondents (departments), this only had 2 set of questions which were exceptional to 384 individuals, from all the departments. There was segments for bio data, name of the department, and background information of respondent. The second part focused on the objectives of the research: (i)To establish the sources of finance of violent extremism group, Al-Shabaab from 2002 to 2022 (ii).To analyse the role of violent extremism financing in Kenya’s defence policy with Somalia from 2002-2022.

Accuracy of data collection was done in all the targeted department while observing all research ethics, data collection was done in three weeks, the first week, a letter of introduction was sent to the various departments of the target population then followed by copies of informed consent forms which were attached to every questionnaire forms sent to these groups mentioned above by the help of research assistants. This was for familiarization and filling in of questionnaire forms which were closed ended with

more than one choice structure. In the third week, the researcher with the help of research assistants was able to collect all fully filled forms from the respondents/ departments concerned. The forms were completed on time and the feedback was very crucial in helping to understand the subject matter.

Testing for Validity and Reliability of instruments

For reliability check, tools was tested by use of test retest methods to examine the consistency of the results. This was done by evaluating kappa and agreement level. The researcher used the process of code and recode with the same coding protocol. Primary code was the researcher and SME was the second coder. There was positive correlation coefficient between the first and the second occasion the tools were used. The tool was there for reliable and more suitable for the same. The validity of the codes was done by developing a comprehensive and structured coding protocol, subject matter expert (SME) was used to review the protocol and node hierarchy, items were revised based on the feedback.

Data analysis Procedure

The Data coding, formatting, sorting, editing was followed in most the processing and analysis methods. All the data being qualitative in nature, descriptive techniques were applied. NVIVO was used as the analysing tool, it was done through thematic analysis process for the research questions posed by the research. Also data-group relationship was well-designed to give explanations for the shift of the proportions, pattern and trends in the data. Data presentation was done by use of table, pie charts and graphs.

Ethical considerations

The researcher ensured full compliance with the regulations governing research work from Mt Kenya University. The Ethical Review Committee. (ERC). NACOSTI certificate was obtained before the start of the data collection as a sign of compliance with research ethics. All respondents were informed of the reasons for the study and rights in general were highly respected. Right to voluntarily participation and confidentiality as far as respondent's identity is concerned.

Presentation of Research Findings

The findings from the data collected have been extensively discussed, and additional comments on the findings are presented. This chapter is divided into two sections: general information obtained about the respondents' demographics, including their gender and occupation; research findings obtained from the field; and discussion.

Demographic Features

The data from the respondents of this study was based on gender, which was to get the responses of both sex as far as the investigation is concerned. Gender is very important in decision-making, stakeholder' engagement, and implementation strategy. This was also done to ensure the results had input and to apply to everyone. Education was very crucial, as it helped in understanding the questions posed and providing in-depth response explanations. The respondent's occupation was critical in determining their department of origin to avoid inaccuracies in questionnaire monitoring and response to the questions posed. All these were very significant inputs while analysing the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia.

Table 3: Gender Response.

Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Female	140	36.46%
Male	244	63.54%
Total	384	100.0

Source: Mayo & Mwatela (2023)

According to Table .3 above, out of the 384 respondents, 140 (36.46%) were female, while the rest, 244 (63.54%), were male. There was a need to know the take of both genders as far as the research was concerned and also keep up with the affirmative action the Kenyan government has put in place on gender issues. 50/50 gender representation was not met in the study, as most women were on maternity leave and others were on their annual leave, so they couldn't be found during the data collection process. Lastly, the nature of activities involved in these agencies and departments are deemed menial this is confirmed by. (Ambeyi, 2021) Figure 2, illustrates the distribution in percentage of the respondent's gender.




Figure 2 Percentage of the respondent's gender
Source: Mayo & Mwatela (2023)

Level of education of the Respondents


The research endeavoured to take into consideration of the level of education of the respondents, this was to factor in their comprehension of the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia. The frequencies were as follows, Secondary education, diploma, graduate and post-graduate.

Table 4: Level of education of the Respondents

Education level	Frequency	Percentage
Secondary Education	42	10.93
Diploma	66	17.19
Graduate	214	60.94
Post Graduate	62	16.15
Total	384	100

Source: Mayo & Mwatela (2023)

Figure 4: Level of education



Source: Mayo & Mwatela (2023)

From the table 4. Above, out of the 384 respondents, 10.93% had ‘O’ level education. 17.19% had college diploma. 60.94% had university degree and 16.94% were post-graduate holders. Those with university degree were 76.09%, this clearly indicated that all the respondents had high literacy level, were able to understand research questions and answer them appropriately. It further indicated that respondents with diploma, degree and postgraduate contributed immensely to the outcome of this study, they were 93.28%. This also confirms the accuracy of response given by the respondents on array of questions answered by them. Figure 4. displays the distribution percentage of level of education.

Departments of the respondents

The study targeted and interviewed respondents from the following government departments; Kenya Defence Forces, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, National Counter Terrorism Centre officials and Immigration Officials. They deal with defence policy formulation and implementation and as such were in good position to give the much needed insights.as the distribution shown in the Table 5, below.

Table 5: Department of the Respondents

Respondents Department	Frequency	Percentage
National Counter Terrorism Centre	60	15.6
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	137	35.7
Kenya Defence Forces	137	35.7
Immigration Officials	50	13.0
Total	384	100

Source: Mayo & Mwatela (2023)




Figure 5: Respondent’s Department

Source: Mayo & Mwatela (2023)

Knowing the department of the respondents in this study is very important. Immigration Official had 13% of the respondents. National Counter Terrorism Centre had 15.6%. Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 35.7%. Kenya Defence Forces had 35.7%. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Kenya Defence Forces had the highest number of respondents. This was due to the fact that, the KDF deal with violent extremism both in the country and in Somalia making them suitable to have more respondents. As for the MFA, they deal with all foreign policies between Kenya and other nations making them very important part of this study. Figure 4.3 below showing distribution of respondent’s department.

Response Rate

The researcher dispatched 384 questionnaire forms, all were returned to the researcher. All the questionnaires were filled correctly and as such were all used to enter data, therefor the researcher analysed 384 research instruments making it 100% percent return rate which is well above the mandatory, as posited by Mugenda

and Mugenda, (2003). Going by the study objectives and the research questions. The returned forms were cleaned, edited and coded. The respondents were 384 drawn from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Immigration officials, National Counter Terrorism Centre and the Kenya Defence Forces.

The sources of finance of violent extremism group, Al-Shabaab from 2002 to 2022

In order to understand whole phenomenal of violent extremism, the research sort to know how the violent extremism group(Al-Shabaab) get their funding(Sources of Finance), illegal money services, smuggling of hard drugs and narcotics, illegal poaching and smuggling of goods across the borders as shown in the tables below Source: Primary Data, 2023.

I. The smuggled hard drugs and narcotics.

The study sort to investigate drugs and narcotics which are smuggled to finance violent extremism, they were, Bhang, Heroin, Cocaine and Opium. The respondents were allowed to choose more than once. The table below shows the distribution.

Table6: Drugs and narcotics

Smuggled Drugs / Narcotics	Frequency	Percentage
Bhang	30	7.81
Heroin	301	78.39
Cocaine	330	85.94
Opium	36	9.38

Source: Author (2023)




Figure 6: Smuggled drugs and narcotics

Source: Author (2023)

Pursuant to the findings of the research, cocaine 85.94%. 83.33% indicated bhang (Cannabis Sativa). 78.39% indicated heroin, and 9.38% indicated opium. From the data above, it is clear there was involvement of hard drugs and narcotics. This agrees with (Moshe, 2015, Cole, 2018)

(ii). The goods being smuggled across the border.

The research sort to know which goods were being smuggled across the border to finance violent extremism,

the researcher found out that: sugar, milk powder and animal products, rice and wear apparel were some of them, the table 4.7 show the distribution.

Table 7: The distribution Smuggled goods

Smuggled Goods	Frequency	Percentage
Sugar	384	100
Milk powder and animal products	384	100
Rice	370	96.35
Wear apparel	100	26.04

Source: Author, (2023)




Figure 7: Smuggled Goods

Source: Author (2023)

The results showed that most of the respondents 100% indicated sugar smuggling. This is supported by Rasmussen, (2017) that sugar being consumed in Kenya at that time mostly in the North Eastern part of the country was being smuggled from Somalia and the Al-Shabaab was controlling the flow therefore benefiting from the sale. 100% indicated milk powder and animal products. 96.35% indicated rice while 26.04% indicated wear apparel. A study carried out by Muteti et, al (2018), named (Borderland and Related Crimes and Security Threat in Kenya) indicated all the above items as sources of finance for the Al-Shabaab as they were being smuggled into the country from Somalia.

(iii) The illegal wildlife gems being smuggled.

The research sort to investigate illegal wildlife gems being smuggled and trafficked, Ivory, Game meat, Animal skin/hide and live animals were the most affected. Table 4.8 below shows distribution.

Table 8: The distribution Illegal wildlife gems

Illegal wildlife Gems	Frequency	Percentage
Ivory	384	100
Game meat	340	88.54
Animal skin/hide	360	93.75
Live animals	180	46.88

Source: Author (2023)




Figure 8: Illegal Wildlife gems

Source: Author (2023)

As per the results of table 4.8 above, 100% indicated Ivory/tusks as the most trafficked. This confirms Maguire and Haelein (2015) on their work on illegal ivory trade. 93.75% indicated animal skin, 88.54% indicated game meat Muteti et.al (2018) and lastly 46.88% indicated live animals, Costa (2019).

(iv) The illegal money services.

The researcher sort to know some of the illegal money services for financing violent extremism, diaspora remittances, shadow/ untraceable banking systems, personal funding, extortion and taxation were the major areas of concern. They are distributed in the table 4.9 below.

Table 9: The distribution of Illegal money Services

Illegal money Services	Frequency	Percentage
Shadow/ untraceable banking system	200	52.08
Diaspora Remittances	310	80.73
Personal Funding	301	78.39
Extortion and taxation	384	100

Source: Author (2023)




Figure 9: Illegal money Services
Source: Author (2023)

On the basis of the results of table 9 above, all the respondents 100% agreed that taxation and extortion were the leading sources of finance this contents with the findings of UNMGSE report (2011). 80.73% indicated that diaspora remittances this supports Maguire and Haelein (2015). While 78.39 % indicted personal funding, 52.08% indicated Hawala (untraceable banking systems) (Ambeyi, 2021).

From the above research findings, the survey indicated It indicated that sugar, rice milk powder are some of the household goods/ items which were being smuggled across the border from Somalia to the local markets. This agrees with the research findings of a study carried out by Muteti et, al (2018), named (Borderland and Related Crimes and Security Threat in Kenya) as some of the main sources of finance for the Al-Shabaab as they were being smuggled into the country from Somalia. A report by Journalist for Justice report-2015 indicating the smuggling activities in the border of Kenya and Somalia. Some of these goods were finding their way to the Eastleigh area of Nairobi. Profits from these goods would find their way back in Somalia where they couldn't be traced by both Kenya and Somalia authority

The above mentioned drugs were being transported from Asian side of the globe through the Al-Shabaab controlled territories to the market like Kenya where protection fee was the main and the only source of finance received by the Al-Shabaab militants. Some were left for the local use as it was termed "motivation use" during their suicidal actions. (Shin, 2001), (Clerke, 2016) in violent extremism financing in the period under review.(Moshe, 2015, Cole,2018)

As for the illegal game jewels, they were sold in various markets in the Middle East and Asian, live animals like pangolin were being sold to the Arab world for domestication. Game meat and animal skin were sold in China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and ivory found their way to Asian markets for rich clientele. All this money were channelled back for the VEG financing.

The illegal money services shows how wide Al-Shabaab finance base was, including getting cash from all over the world from their sympathizers. (The U.S. Department of The Treasury, report of 2023.) (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies report 2023).This indicates how wide their influence was to the extent of getting foreign financial support, these sources ensured money could be accessed easily to fund their activities.

As Durnagol, (2009) observed for drugs and narcotics, all these sources of finance were very critical to the violent extremist group's campaign. They contributed in the furtherance of violent extremism in a number of ways: They ensured steady supplies of cash for VEG, they also promoted corruption in law enforcement and governmental/civil offices as the proceeds were used for bribes. All these enable services which are useful for VE actions, movements of terrorist personnel, supports illicit arms acquisition, and the production of fake identification documents. Lastly, the businesses owned and operated by the Al-Shabaab members and sympathizers acted as centres for money laundering for the group.

Discussion

The role of violent extremism financing and its influence in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia (2002-2022)

Combatting the financing of violent extremism requires a multifaceted foreign policy strategy that integrates diplomatic, economic, and intelligence efforts while also addressing the underlying drivers of radicalization. In addition to direct measures targeting the financing of violent extremism, foreign policy efforts should also focus on promoting inclusive governance, social development, and efforts to counter extremist narratives. By addressing systemic issues that contribute to marginalization and disenfranchisement, foreign policy can help to diminish the fertile ground in which violent extremism takes root. This requires a sustained and coordinated effort at the international level, engaging with a wide range of stakeholders including governments, civil society, and local communities.

Overall, an effective foreign policy response to violent extremism financing demands a holistic approach that considers the interconnected nature of the underlying drivers, as well as the need for international cooperation and collaboration. By addressing the multifaceted aspects of the issue, foreign policy can contribute to preventing the spread of violent extremism and fostering greater stability and security across borders. Overall, addressing the financing of violent extremism requires a multifaceted foreign policy approach that includes diplomatic collaboration, economic measures, and security cooperation with affected countries.

To curb violent extremism financing, the Kenyan government came up with assorted remedies some targeting local financial and international systems. Following a series of attacks in Kenya particularly in the aftermath of the Garissa University attack, Kenya began to exercise tougher measures with regards to controlling the movement of finances. The adoption and implementation of the global legal framework against terrorism financing has represented a watershed moment in preventing and combating terrorism financing. Kenya acted decisively to adjust its defence policy to sanction foreign governments' intervention and assistance in combating the threat. It was unearthed that Kenya was supporting terror activities of the militant group through its sugar importation this is supported by Rasmussen, (2017), which was being smuggled and sold to the local Kenyan market at a price lower than the locally manufactured sugar. Kenya's military intervention in Somalia targeted key financial hubs such as the port of Kismayu, which acted as the transit point for charcoal going to the Middle East. Other legitimate businesses in Somalia also lost their constant supply as the port was closed down, these businesses were being extorted by the Al-Shabaab which formed part of their sources of income. The government also shut down money transfer firms under suspicions of covert activities with the al-Shabaab, 86 closures were reported (Kimani, 2018). These firms were responsible for the transaction of money between Somali community and their business counterpart inside Somalia.

The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act: The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (AML/CTF) was passed in 2019 to address the financing of terrorism. The Act requires financial institutions and other entities to report suspicious transactions and to take measures to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The Act also requires financial institutions to maintain records of all transactions and to verify the identity of their customers. It also provides for the confiscation of property belonging to those convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money laundering Act. The latter act was signed into law in 2017. The goal of the act is to impede corruption as well as fight against the financing of terrorism and its related activities (Kenya Law, 2012). This law was to prevent the high cases of violent extremism financing, it clearly stipulated that cash on transit from Jurisdictions like Yemen, Iraq, Colombia and Somalia into and out of Kenya are totally blocked out. All the above laws and defence strategies affected movement of goods, services and people from Somalia into Kenya, this meant a permanent closer of some businesses that depended on Kenya for survival. A move which is painful but necessary for Kenya's defence policy strategy and blow to Somalia survival.

Furthermore, Kenya's defence policy increasingly focused on addressing the root causes of violent extremism, recognizing the importance of engaging communities and addressing grievances that may contribute to radicalization. This holistic approach aimed to not only counter the immediate financing of

violent extremist activities but also to prevent the spread and recruitment of individuals into such groups.

At the same time, intelligence efforts played a crucial role in identifying and targeting the financial networks that support violent extremist activities. But still much needs to be done, this involves gathering and analysing financial intelligence to uncover illicit funding sources and transactions. Additionally, it is essential to work closely with financial institutions to strengthen regulations and reporting mechanisms to detect and prevent suspicious transactions related to extremist financing.

Summary of findings

The study sort to know: (i) The sources of finance for violent extremism group (Al-Shabaab) (ii) How they contributed to the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia from 2002 to 2022. A review of the results showed that: Ivory/tusks as the most trafficked. Game items like, illicit ivory trafficking, animal skin, game meat from illegal poaching, and live animals like pangolin which was also featured in the study by Costa (2019) contributed to the funding. Around the time under review there was steady rise in poaching where elephants and rhinos died as a result. These wildlife gem were being used to raise money to sponsor violent extremism in the region. Maguire and Haelein (2015), Costa (2019). This means that the illicit wildlife trade had a significant role in the funding of violent extremism. As for drugs and Narcotics, the survey shows that, cocaine, bhang (Cannabis Sativa), heroin, and opium was being smuggled in the Kenyan market by the escort of the Al-Shabbab who were doing it for money and small portion remained for their consumption before going for raid and attacks. According to the facts presented above, hard drugs and narcotics were involved in the financing of violent extremism throughout the time period under consideration this can be attested to by UNMGSE report (2011).

The research sort to know which house hold goods were being smuggled across the border to the Kenyan market to finance violent extremism, the researcher found out that cheap sugar, animal products milk powder and canned meat, rice and wear apparel were some of them. These items are sold in Nairobi, Mombasa and the larger North Eastern parts of Kenya in legitimate businesses but the profit goes back to Somalia. Lastly, taxation and extortion was the leading sources of finance confirming the UNMGSE report (2011). Personal funding, Hawala (untraceable banking systems) were done by the locals in Somalia as well as in Kenya to give their contribution towards what they called "God's work". Sympathizers living in Western countries were also responsible for funding these Al-Shabaab through diaspora remittances a fact being supported by Maguire & Haelein, (2015). All the sources of finance, legal or illegal, played a major role in violent extremism financing: they supplied cash for VEG activities, the money also promoted corruption in law enforcement and governmental/civil offices. All these enabled services, which were useful for violent extremism, facilitation of movements of terrorist personnel, support for illicit arms acquisition, and the production of fake identification documents, which enabled the entry of violent extremist group members to Kenya.

Conclusion

The first research objective was to analyse the influence of violent extremism financing in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia, the findings was that sources of financing mentioned were very critical to the violent extremism groups. Violent extremist group in Somalia had illegitimate businesses which were making profits to fund their activities like selling of household goods. Similarly, smuggling of goods across the borders: smuggling of hard drug, narcotics, illegal money services and wildlife trafficking were some of the top sources of finance. To curb the cash flow and sale of the same, the Kenya's government came up with measures which reduced the attacks and shifted Kenya's defence policy towards Somalia. In summation, with no sources of funds and financing, violent extremism will not flourish or continue in their active attacks. This therefore meant going after their sources of finance, some businesses with the legitimate market in Kenya had to suffer.

Recommendations

Based on the research findings the following were recommended:

Targeting and Freezing of Assets: Kenya and Somalia governments should have a bilateral agreement on identification, tracing and profiling of all the legal businesses or illegal sources of finance for violent extremist group sanctioned and closed down permanently.

Public-Private Partnerships in Countering Financing of Terrorism: There should be formation of drugs enforcement units within the Kenya Defence Forces and Somalia Army to control, track, trace and destroy drug routes. Arrest cartels and traffickers cut the flow of drugs between the two countries especially, in the southern parts and Ports of Kismayu in Somalia. The northern and coastal regions, like Kiunga and the entire Lamu, in Kenya.

Kenya- Somalia border, needs around the clock monitoring to safeguard and discourage the proliferation of illegal goods such as sugar, milk etc. whose proceeds can't be traced or accounted for hence end up being laundered and financing violent extremism.

Financial Intelligence Gathering and Analysis: There is need for constant patrols in the national parks and wildlife conservancies to preserve wild animals from sophisticated poachers looking for game treasures like elephant tusks, pangolin, and game meat. GPS trackers should be installed on animals with high demand in the international black market whose populations have declined and are on the verge of extinction. Collaboration between Kenya, Somalia, the UAE, China and Saudi Arabia, who are the key consumers and the greatest market for illicit wildlife jewels, must be encouraged to combat the vice.

Conflict of Interest

The researcher has no conflict of interest with regards to the publication of the paper.

References

- Acharya, A. (2009). *Targeting Terrorist Financing: international cooperation and new regimes*. Routledge.
- Adar, K. G. & P. J. Schraeder (2007). Kenya's Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy-Making Process: Analytical Context. *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African Foreign Policy, Volume 11: A comparative Perspective of Eastern Africa* (pp.
- Akram, M., Nasar, A., & Rehman, A. (2021). Misuse of charitable giving to finance violent extremism; A futuristic actions study amidst COVID-19 pandemic. *Social Sciences & Humanities Open*, 4(1), 100140.
- Aldrich, D. P. (2014). First steps towards hearts and minds? USAID's countering violent extremism policies in Africa. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(3), 523-546.
- Alexander J. S. (2020) *Countering Violent Extremism: U.S Foreign policy and the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism partnership* (Ph.D. Dissertation) Walden University USA.
- Aliyu, A. (2015). *Countering Violent Extremism in Somalia: The Role of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)*. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 9(2), 5-20.
- Ambeyi L. M. (2021) *Influence of terror activities on Kenya's foreign policy shift 2005-2020* (Master's thesis) Africa Nazarene University Kenya.
- Barone, D. (2019). The decentralized finance-violent extremism nexus: ideologies, technical skills, strong and weak points. *SICUREZZA, TERRORISMO E SOCIETÀ*, 41.
- Bor, T. K. (2020). *Military Involvement in Multi-agency Security Operations in Eastern Africa: a Case of Kenya Defence Forces* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).
- Cannon, B.J., 2016. Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya's Proposed Border Wall with Somalia. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 7(2), pp.23–37. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1235>
- Carius, A., Ivleva, D., Pohl, B., Rüttinger, L., Schaller, S., Tänzler, D., & Vivekananda, J. (2018). *A foreign policy perspective on the SDGs*. Berlin: adelphi. Retrieved, 12, 2018.
- Cimini, G., & Simoncini, G. (2023). *From Counter-Terrorism to Preventing Violent Extremism: Security Practices and Approaches in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia. Between Integration and Radicalization in North Africa*, 97.
- Colin J Beck, Eric W. Schoon - 2017 - *osf.io*. *Terrorism and Social Movements; Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, 2nd Edition. osf.io
- Costa, J. (2019). *Examining wildlife trafficking networks in East Africa through the lens of social network analysis*: Basel Institute on Governance.
- De Mesquita, B. *Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. Retrieved 22 Feb. 2023, from <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-395>.
- Devarajan, S., & Mottaghi, L. (2016). *Middle East and North Africa Economic Monitor, October 2016: Economic Perspectives on Violent Extremism*. World Bank Publications.
- Elliot, A., & Holzer, G. S. (2009). The invention of 'terrorism' in Somalia: paradigms and policy in US foreign relations. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 16(2), 215-244.
- Filmy, Mohamed Fidel, "Egypt Declares State of Alert in Wake of Attack on Israeli Embassy," CNN, September 10, 2011. As of January 14, 2021: <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/09/09/egypt.protests/>
- Fonseca, B., Rosen, J. D., Fonseca, B., & Rosen, J. D. (2017). *Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism. The New US Security Agenda: Trends and Emerging Threats*, 107-134.
- Gettleman, J. (2018). *Kenya's War on Terror*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/world/africa/kenya-somalia-war-on-terror.html>.
- Gichira, S. G. (2020). *Terrorism as conflict in transition: A critical analysis of Counter Violent Extremism strategies in Kenya* [Thesis, Strathmore University]. <http://hdl.handle.net/11071/12037>
- Heyen-Dubé, T., & Rands, R. (2022). *Evolving doctrine and modus operandi: violent extremism in Cabo Delgado*. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 33(3), 437-466. <https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/52429>

- IS, A. Foreign involvement in preventing and countering violent extremism. SECURITY REVIEW, 123.
- Kaburu, M. K. (2017). Decision Making Theory and Foreign Policy Process: Empirical Ontological and Epistemological Contextualization of Kenya's Diplomacy towards Somalia, 1996-2012. PhD Dissertation, United States International University-Africa
- Kenyanya, E. N. (2022). Kenya's foreign policy implementation and its implication on the fight against terrorism: 1998-2018 (Doctoral dissertation, Africa Nazarene University).
- Kibet Robert. (2016). Terrorism and Kenya's Foreign Policy (Contextual Analysis). Master's thesis, United States International University-Africa, Kenya.
- Kundnani, A., & Hayes, B. (2018). The globalisation of countering violent extremism policies. Undermining Human Rights, Instrumentalising Civil Society. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.
- Lestina, F. (2020). Trends in US Foreign Policy Prioritizations, 2000–2019.
- Markovic, V. (2021). Fighting a losing battle? Countering terrorism financing in Nigeria and Somalia. South African Journal of International Affairs, 28(2), 167-186.
- Milton D. J. (2020) Foreign Policy and Transnational Terrorism (Ph.D. Dissertation) Florida State University Library USA.
- Moorthy Muthuswamy - 2021 - osf.io. Does Sharia Act as both a Mediator and Moderator in Salafi Radicalism?. osf.io
- Morris C. (2019) To what has U.S. Foreign Policy contributed to an increase in religious inspired terrorism since 1945: Global Fault lines vol.6, no.2, 186- 203.
- Mutisya, C. M (2017) Conflict in time, petrified in space: Kenya-Somalia border Geopolitical conflict. (Master's thesis) Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
- Mwanika, P. N. (2015). Kenya's Soft Power Diplomacy and Strategic Intervention in the Somali Conflict. Occasional Paper, No.1. Africa Institute of South Africa
- Mwaniki, D. M. (2019). Changing Strategies in Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Africa: Case of Kenya (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).
- Nawa. A. T. (2020) The impact of Boko Haram terror threat on cross border security in West Africa: The case of Nigeria – Cameroon border (master's thesis) USIU-Africa Kenya.
- Niaz A. Shah, (2008) Self-Defense in Islamic and International Law: Assessing Al-Qaeda and the Invasion of Iraq (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,), p. 47
- Nkomo. S and Clerk S. B. (2020) Violent Extremism in Africa: Popular assessments from the Eastern Corridor. Afrobarometer. Policy Paper No.65/May/2020
- Ogenga, F. (2016, December). Philosophizing alternative Pan-African media and society approaches to countering female violent extremism in Kenya for peace and security. Washington, DC: Southern Voices Network for Peace building, The Wilson Center Africa Program. Retrieved February 27, 2022, from
- Okwany, C. C. (2016). Kenya's Foreign Policy towards Somalia, 2011-2016; A Contribution to Insecurity.
- Omotuyi S. and Omotuyi M.V. (2020) Nigeria and great powers: The impacts of the Boko Haram terrorism on Nigeria's Foreign policy: International Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis vol.10 no.1
- Onyango, M. J. O. (2021). Trends in the implementation of Kenya's national strategy for countering violent extremism: 2016-2019 (Doctoral dissertation, University of Johannesburg).
- Palmer, G. & Morgan, T. (2006). A Theory of Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400832644>
- Parmar, I. (2005). Catalyzing events, think tanks and American foreign policy shifts: A comparative analysis of the impacts of Pearl Harbor 1941 and 11 September 2001. Government and Opposition, 40(1), 1-25.
- Patel, K. (2018). Game theory and the Somali conflict. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2018/aug/23/game-theory-and-the-somali-conflict>.
- Pillar, P. R. (2004). Terrorism and US foreign policy. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Plummer, D. (2014, October 8). Masculinity and terror: The missing conversation. The Conversation. Retrieved February 26, 2022, from <http://theconversation.com/masculinity-and-terror-the-missing->

conversation-32276

- RAHMAN, M. M. (2021). A Review of Neo-Classical Realism and its Assessment of Independent and Intervening Variables in Foreign Policy Analysis. *International Journal of Politics and Security*, 3(2), 24-47.
- Raj, A. J. (2019). Challenges in counter terrorism and counter violent extremism in Malaysia. In *Countering Insurgencies and Violent Extremism in South and South East Asia* (pp. 206-222). Routledge.
- Raj, A. *The Malaysian Experience: Managing Religious Radicalization and Countering Extremism*. ИСЛАМ АЗЫРКЫ СВЕТТИК МАМЛЕКЕТТЕ, 178.
- Ramadhan R and K. Ayiera (2023) Trends of Violent Extremism Attacks and Arrests in Kenya January-December 2022. CHRIPS. Report no.6
- Rasmussen, J. (2017) *Sweet secret: Smuggling and state formation in the Kenya-Somalia borderlands*. Danish Institute for International Studies 2017:11.
- Runde, D. F., Bandura, R., & Murphy, O. (2019). *Strategic Directions for the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)*. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 18.
- Safia Farole - 2018 - osf.io. *Regional Security Institutions and Weak States: The Case of Post-Conflict Somalia and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*. osf.io
- Sebastian Schutte, Constantin Ruhe, andrew linke - 2020 - osf.io. *How indiscriminate violence fuels conflicts between groups: Evidence from Kenya*. osf.io
- Silverman A.L. and Church J. (2002), "Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism: A Comparison of Western and Islamic Norms for the Use of Political Violence," 44 p. 78. 71-90). Lanham: University of America Press, Inc
- Singh, R. (2022). *Foreign Policy and Countering Terrorism*. *Contemporary Terrorism Studies*, 454.
- Suzuki, A. (2018). Audience costs, domestic economy and coercive diplomacy. *Research & Politics*, 5(3). <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018787119>
- Zeuthen, M. (2015). *From Policy to Practice: Findings and lessons learned from a research-based pilot countering violent extremism programme in the Horn of Africa*. *COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM*, 31.
- Zoubir, Y. (2022). *The Maghreb in International Relations*. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. *Role of Violent Extremism Financing in Defence Policy*