




RESEARCH ARTICLE

Section: *Sociology and Community Development*

The consequences of the Second Palestinian Intifada and its economic and social impact on the Palestinian people “2000-2005” - According to documentation from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

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This study sheds light on the profound impacts of the Second Palestinian Intifada on the economic and social fabric of Palestinian society between 2000 and 2005. The study aims to quantify the Intifada’s effects across various units of the Palestinian community, by analyzing data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and evaluating the dynamics of the impacts. The analyzed result indicated that the crisis exacerbated an existing economic crisis, resulting in deteriorating living conditions characterized by increased poverty and unemployment rates in Palestine. Consequently, Palestinians endured a prolonged excruciating hardship, with household incomes plummeting and the number of individuals living below the poverty line skyrocketing to an unimaginable figure. Unemployment rates surged by more than 27% on average, further exacerbating the socio-economic challenges faced by the Palestinian population.

KEYWORDS: The second Intifada, Palestinian economy, economic impact, history of the Intifada, social impact, unemployment

Research Journal in Advanced Humanities

Volume 6, Issue 1, 2025

ISSN: 2708-5945 (Print)

ISSN: 2708-5953 (Online)

ARTICLE HISTORY

Submitted: 17 September 2024

Accepted: 24 January 2025

Published: 25 January 2025

HOW TO CITE

Abdalla, A. A., AL Etaneh, G. F. ., Al-Khatib, J. M. ., & Aldajah, M. N. . (2025). The consequences of the Second Palestinian Intifada and its economic and social impact on the Palestinian people “2000-2005” - According to documentation from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. *Research Journal in Advanced Humanities*, 6(1). <https://doi.org/10.58256/tjbsx092>



Published in Nairobi, Kenya by Royallite Global, an imprint of Royallite Publishers Limited

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1. Introduction

The period wherein the Second Palestinian Intifada began represents a critical period in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, extending from September 28, 2000, until the adoption of the armistice decision known as the '*Sharm el-Sheikh Agreement*' on February 8, 2005 (Brym & Aranj, 2006, P. 1975). The rising implications of the Second Palestinian Intifada emerged due to Palestinian protests against the visit of Ariel Sharon, the Israeli right-wing opposition leader, to the courtyards of the *Al-Aqsa Mosque*, accompanied by a large number of soldiers and Israeli border guards (Ben, 2002, P. 45). The visit was publicly endorsed by the Israeli Minister Ehud Barak, which invariably communicated to protests among Palestinians (Khawaja, 2003, P. 427). The response of Israeli soldiers to the protest was characterized by extreme violence (Klein, 2003, P. 17), leading to a massive killing of the Palestinian innocent citizens, and injured individuals from various segments of the Palestinian population (Roy, 2001, P. 20).

This incident was the spark that ignited the Palestinian territories with a series of bloody confrontations, which extended to components of the Palestinian community, including various cities, towns, and villages beyond the Green Line. Among the most significant negative impacts of the Intifada was the Israeli decision to impose a blockade on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Hammami, 2004, P.32). Consequently, an economic and social crisis was created, causing suffering to the Palestinian people for half a decade.

The rationale and motivation for choosing this research topic is to highlight the unsettled implications of the Second Palestinian Intifada and its impact on the Palestinian people from an economic and social perspective. The study also spotlights the extent of the economic decline that affected the Palestinian economy during the years of the Intifada and assesses the socio-psychological effects on Palestinian families.

1.1 Importance of the Study

The significance of this study lies in understanding the historical development of the Second Palestinian Intifada, considered one of the most important historical milestones in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The study primarily aims at highlighting and explicating the importance of the study in the following dimensions:

1. **Theoretical Aspect:** The study contributes to examining the effects of the Palestinian Intifada on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people. It also studies how the Palestinian people insisted on overcoming that crisis despite all the circumstances and obstacles they have been facing.
2. **Practical Aspect:** This historical study clearly needed statistical studies to investigate the credibility of information through facts, figures, and percentages. Therefore, reliance was placed on statistical documents issued by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. These documents help determine unemployment rates and the decline in the Palestinian economy during the years of the Palestinian Intifada.

1.2 Research Objectives

This study primarily aims at exploring and explicating the negative impacts of the Second Palestinian Intifada. The following specific objectives are pursued

1. To explore the necessity to prove the determination of the Palestinian people to resist economic conditions emerging from the crisis, irrespective of all the obstacles imposed by the occupation, thereby striving to achieve self-determination.
2. To illustrate and evaluate the internal, political, economic, intellectual, social, and psychological impacts of the Intifada in Palestine.
3. To establish how the Palestinian Intifada was able to change some ideas and perspectives among Jewish youth by convincing them that the Palestinians' insistence on resistance stems from their attachment and connection to their homeland, Palestine.
4. To analyze the positive and negative changes that occurred among the Palestinian people during the years of the Intifada.

1.3. Study Procedures

1. Review studies, reports, and documentaries related to the Intifada in Palestine by tracking the events of the Palestinian Intifada and examining all statistics issued by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
2. Review the information from various scientific reports, and peer-reviewed journals concerning the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people during and after the Second Palestinian Intifada.
3. Collect and organize historical statistical information into tables, facilitating the evaluation and analysis of those numbers to obtain accurate percentages.

To attain these procedural directions, the study utilized various tools for gathering information and data using the historical-analytical method.

2. Brief Summary of Findings from Previous Studies

Arrays of studies on the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000–2005) has been largely conducted with varied methods, majorly highlighting the economic, social, and psychological effects of the uprising on the Palestinian people and its wider political implications the focus of the research. Roy (2001) described the debilitating effects of the Intifada on the Palestinian economy, and also explored how military blockades and curfew restricted trade and access to basic services. BenYishay (2002) examined how Palestinians are resilient in the face of various systemic economic challenges, and how communities are able to adapt locally by utilizing informal economies and grassroots support systems. These findings are indicative of a greater theme of economic survival at the hands of the occupation; that is, the resilience and collective determination of the Palestinian people. These studies focus on economic stagnation, but they also highlight the spirit of the written resistance that exists in the Palestinian community, considerably related to the intent of this study to explore the people's struggle for self-determination despite the economic hazards.

The literature has also had a great deal of discussion on social and psychological dimensions of the Intifada. The “moral economy” of everyday resistance at military checkpoints is introduced by Hammami (2004), with acts of defiance standing in for larger struggles over dignity and autonomy. Brym and Araj (2006) analyze the psychological results of Intifada, and found that the use of suicide bombings was not just disarmed resistance, but the expression of profound social feelings of dissatisfaction and despair. According to Khawaja (2003), the shifts in family structures and coping mechanism within the society resulted as a consequence of demographic changes, although more varied for women and children. This work examines how social dynamics and resilience over duress were shaped by the Intifada. Based on these perspectives, this immediate research goes further by offering bigger picture analyses of their internal social and psychological impacts, and also filling in gaps about the extent to which the effects of these transformations contributed to long term political and intellectual shifts in Palestinian society.

The Palestinian territories were not the only place that was affected by the Intifada; Israeli society—especially Jewish youth—also became affected. According to Klein (2003) and Sayigh (2002), the resistance that took place during the Intifada was both sustained and high-profile acts of defiance that challenged long-standing narratives within Israel. The authors suggest that they triggered certain segments among Israeli society, mainly younger generations, to question the morality of the occupation and accept the connection of the Palestinians with their homeland. In this regard, this immediate study will also determine how the Intifada influenced Jewish youths' views. However, rather than focusing on how high intensity events create change, as many previous studies have done, this research will look deeper, focusing on more marginal changes in ideology and perception, and understand how resistance movements change public opinion over time.

Furthermore, researchers have comprehended both the positive and the negative effects of Intifada on Palestinian society. Farsakh (2005), and Al-Khuzami (2010) analyzed the negative spin offs like greater poverty, political fragmentation and the psychological cost borne by civilians. Baroud (2006) and Bahis et al. (2009) also demonstrated the unity and collective resilience of the struggle; and the cultural and intellectual renewal that crystallized against adversity. That duality, however, points to the complexity of the Intifada's legacy, of which this study aims to extend through critical assessment of the positive and negative changes within Palestinian society. Having considered the multifaceted impacts and filled in gaps in the literature, this research is thereby situated as a comprehensive examination of the short- and long-term consequences of the Intifada.

3. Study Methodology

To critically attend to the objectives set out in this study, a documentary analysis procedure is considered most suitable method. Here, secondary data from various reliable sources are synthesized and evaluated in connection with the scope of this research. This study relied on the historical-analytical method to track and analyze the changes that occurred to the Palestinian people from 2000 to 2005 following the Intifada. This method involved gathering secondary data that monitored and documented the economic and social conditions the Palestinian people experienced during the Intifada years. The primary data for analysis in this study is based on statistics and figures issued by official Palestinian departments, such as the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

The study was limited to describing the positive and negative aspects suffered by the Palestinian people between 2000 and 2005. The study also relied on secondary data from various reliable sources, including various public databases in Palestine. While the focus was primarily on socio-economic impacts, the analysis also contextualized the findings within the broader political and historical landscape of the Intifada.

4. Findings from Synthesis of Studies

4.1. History of the Palestinian Intifada

The concept of the Palestinian Intifada in contemporary times dates back to the 1980s. At present, the term “Intifada” refers to the first Palestinian Intifada, which began in Gaza in 1987 (Bucaille, 2006, p. 3). It started due to the killing of four young Palestinian men in a collision between an Israeli truck and two vehicles carrying Palestinian workers. The incident quickly sparked protests and clashes across all occupied Palestinian territories (Al-Jubouri, 2020, p.79).

While young Palestinians were the prominent participants in the first Intifada, it was led and directed by the Unified National Leadership of the Palestinian Political Factions (Fawzi, 2002, p.47). Consequently, Israel closed Palestinian universities, arrested many activists, and confiscated their lands (*Al-Tali'a Newspaper*, 1988). The first Intifada mobilized international efforts to find a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, ending in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. The results of the Intifada included the martyrdom of 1,500 Palestinians, thousands of injuries, and a significant decline in the economic infrastructure of the Palestinian people. This, in turn, led to widespread poverty and unemployment among Palestinians, and the economic downturn deepened until the outbreak of the second Intifada (Abdel, 2006 p.514).

Despite the signing of the Oslo Accords by the Palestinian and Israeli sides in 1993, which aimed to de-escalate tensions between the two parties (Shamir&Shikaki 2010, p.43), the Palestinian people were not convinced by the agreement. They perceived it as a violation of Palestinian sovereignty. Meanwhile, Israeli policy continued to implement all its plans in Palestine, culminating in Sharon's desecration of the Al-Aqsa Mosque courtyards in 2000 and Israeli soldiers' violation of religious privacy in the mosque (Abdel 2006, p.513). This ignited the second Intifada, essentially a continuation of the first Intifada that had never indeed ceased (Abu-Jaber, et al 2002, p.113).

4.1.1 Characteristics of the Second Palestinian Intifada

Arrays of reports have documented the significant features of the second Intifada. The Second Palestinian Intifada was marked by its long duration, which had several adverse effects on the Palestinian economy (Al-Riwawi 2005, p.26). It transformed from a peaceful popular uprising into a military confrontation, and was marked by martyrdom operations. The second Intifada slogan was to protect Al-Aqsa and to reject the American-Israeli solutions proposed at the Camp David negotiations in July 2000 (Al- Al-Quds Newspaper, 1988).

The Intifada also had widespread popular involvement (Dor 2004, p.10). It notably erupted in areas classified as Area C, which were completely controlled by the occupation forces and had a clear youth-driven character. It was also characterized by the boycott of Israeli products and the refusal to pay taxes and customs to the Israeli government, which caused significant damage to the Israeli economy (Al-Rimawi 2005, p.28). In

this context, it is essential to understand the main factors that led to the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada.

Arrays of studies have reported that there were tangible preludes that indeed paved the way for a popular uprising due to the repeated skirmishes between Palestinians and the occupation authorities, which had never ceased (Baroud 2006, p.35), as well as the violations of the sanctity of holy places. The negative impacts of the second Palestinian Intifada began to loom on the horizon, leading to some direct causes that resulted in the Intifada, the most important of which were the following:

a) Indirect Causes

- i. The failure of the Oslo Accords and their catastrophic results for the Palestinians created further frustration among Palestinians without any tangible progress or improvement in various aspects of public life in Palestine (Al-Masri & Shahin 2007, p.37).
- ii. The continuation of the occupation's policy of assassinations, arrests, the closure of Palestinian Authority areas, and the refusal to release Palestinian prisoners detained in occupation prisons.
- iii. The continuous construction of settlements, the exclusion of the return of refugees, and the continuous violations in Jerusalem, the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the Ibrahimi Mosque.
- iv. The difficult economic conditions suffered by the Palestinian people due to the blockade on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- v. The policy of closing the main outlets connecting Palestinian villages to the main cities for the movement of Palestinian goods and products led to stifling the Palestinian economy (Al-Sahili 2004, p.144).

b) Direct Causes

- i. The recorded storming of the Al-Aqsa Mosque by Sharon, and roaming in its courtyards led to clashes between worshippers and occupation soldiers in the courtyards of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, resulting in several martyrs, 250 wounded and injuries among Israeli soldiers. This confrontation marked the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which later turned into bloody military confrontations (Abu-Jaber et al. 2002, p.109; Al-Sahili 2004, p.144).
- ii. The Israeli army's assassination of the child *Muhammad al-Durrah* on September 30, 2000, provoked the anger of Palestinians everywhere, prompting them to take to the streets in angry demonstrations and resulting in confrontations with the Israeli army, causing dozens of deaths and injuries (Al-Sahili 2004, p.144).
- iii. Military incursions, mainly the destruction of thousands of homes and houses, and the bulldozing of thousands of dunams of agricultural land.
- iv. Israel's assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder of the Hamas movement, as well as the assassination of a large number of top leaders in Palestinian political and military parties, in an attempt to quell the Palestinian Intifada which erupted in 2000 and to weaken and disrupt the resistance factions (Khalil 2011, p.487).

4.2 The Impact of the Intifada on the Palestinian Economy

The Al-Aqsa Intifada was not a traditional popular civilian uprising; it transformed into an actual form of resistance, somewhat overshadowing all popular activities. Following the Oslo Accords, this shift was driven by the Palestinians' conviction that negotiations alone did not yield any benefits due to Israeli procrastination policies (Kayyali 2002, p.2).

As a result of the negative impacts of the Second Intifada, the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank faced difficult living conditions, leading to a social and economic crisis characterized by a significant rise in poverty and unemployment throughout the period of the Intifada. This crisis sharply declined household income levels (Norman 2010, p.86). A report from the United Nations Relief and Work Agency

(2008) summarized that from the start of the Intifada in September 2000, the number of Palestinians living below the poverty line more than doubled, and unemployment rates in the occupied Palestinian territories rose significantly. The conflict accelerated the Palestinian economy's slide into a deep recession, resulting in unprecedented levels of unemployment and poverty and a sharp decline in family incomes. Despite a population growth of 30% between 1999 and 2006, the Palestinian economy contracted by 10%, and by 2006, Palestinian incomes had declined by 30% compared to their levels in 1999 (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNRWA, 2008, p.6). As a result, economic conditions continued to deteriorate among the general population across various sectors, both rural and urban, and in refugee camps. Unemployment rates soared, reaching nearly 50% of the labor force.

Based on the reports from various sources, the primary reasons for the exacerbating Palestinian unemployment crisis since September 2000 were:

- i. The procedures followed by the Israeli occupation forces, especially the imposition of land closure policies. The closure led to restrictions, obstacles, and complete prohibition on the movement of the workforce and Palestinian goods. These procedures have led to an increase in the number of unemployed Palestinians due to the lack of necessary permits to work in Israel and the settlements. Additionally, these procedures resulted in the isolation of Palestinian villages for long periods, which severely impacted the business environment and foreign trade movements. Furthermore, strong blows were directed at the industrial, construction, agricultural, and service sectors (Unemployment Report in Palestine, The Palestinian NGO portal, Citizen Rights Center, Thought Forum, 2003: 19).
- ii. Economic dependency, which led to the deterioration of the Palestinian economy. This resulted from the Israeli policy, which aimed at controlling the Palestinian economy.
- iii. The separation wall, built during the second Palestinian Intifada, led to the isolation of Palestinian villages in the West Bank, isolating 36 residential communities east of the wall, inhabited by 72,200 Palestinians.

Collectively, these factors have struck the Palestinian economy in all agricultural, industrial, and labor fields. According to economic laws, whenever the economy is negatively affected, there is a corresponding increase in unemployment. Table (1) shows a noticeable increase in unemployment levels during the second Palestinian Intifada. The data provided is relevant to males and females in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between the years 2000 and 2005. Table (1) also shows that the unemployment rate in 2000 did not exceed 14.10%. However, with the deepening of the Palestinian Intifada in 2001, it increased significantly to nearly half. Data from various sources also affirmed that there was another increase in unemployment rates in 2002 due to Israel's isolation policy known as the construction of the (separation wall), which isolated West Bank villages, leading to an increase in unemployment to 41.20%.

Year	Unemployment Rate	Among Males	Among Females	West Bank	Gaza Strip
2000	14.10%	14.40%	12.30%	12.10%	18.70%
2001	25.50%	27.30%	14.10%	20.00%	34.20%
2002	41.20%	43.20%	28.60%	38.10%	48.10%
2003	25.60%	26.90%	18.60%	23.80%	29.20%
2004	26.80%	28.10%	20.10%	22.90%	35.40%
2005	23.50%	23.70%	22.30%	20.30%	30.30%

Table (1): Unemployment Rates in Palestine (National Information Center in Palestine, Unemployment Rates in Palestine Report, State of Palestine, 2020)

The data in table 1 above indicated that unemployment rates in the West Bank were no more than 12.10% in 2000. However, due to Israel's restrictions on the Palestinian people, the unemployment rate peaked to

nearly double in 2002, indicating that the Intifada reached its peak in the West Bank in 2002. The data further indicated that the increase in unemployment in the Gaza Strip was comparable to that in the West Bank.




Figure (1): Rate of Increase in Unemployment Compared to the Year 2000

By conducting a comparative study and calculating the percentages, the data in fig. 1 indicated that the overall unemployment rate increased to unprecedented levels compared to 2000. The rate rose by 11.4% in 2001, the first year of the Intifada. The increase continued into 2002, reaching a record high of 27.1% compared to 2000.

4.3 Economic Sectors Affected by the Palestinian Intifada

The second Intifada significantly impacted various economic sectors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip due to the stringent Israeli policies imposed on the Palestinian people. The most affected sectors are further discussed in the following sections.

i. Impact of the Intifada on Trade and Agriculture

Trade patterns in agriculture within Palestine represent a unique aspect of the Palestinian economy. Although imports remain higher than exports, agriculture contributes significantly to the total Palestinian exports abroad. This sector has shifted towards higher value-added products such as flowers, strawberries, and cherry tomatoes, which are produced as early as November and have a highly competitive advantage in foreign markets (Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency, Report on the Agriculture and Livestock Sector: http://www.pipa.ps/ar_page.php?id=1b7beay1801194Y1b7bea).

During Al-Aqsa Intifada, however, the occupation forces deliberately destroyed the agricultural sector by uprooting many trees, bulldozing crops, and preventing the marketing of agricultural products both domestically and internationally. One statistic indicated that agricultural production decreased at the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, with the value of agricultural production reaching \$979 million compared to previous years. After the Palestinian Intifada ended in 2005, agricultural production value increased to \$1.114 billion due to the signing of the truce agreement in 2005 (Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency, Report on the Agriculture and Livestock Sector: http://www.pipa.ps/ar_page.php?id=1b7beay1801194Y1b7bea).

The destructive policies of the occupation did not stop at agriculture; they extended to all economic sectors. Fundamentally, a decline in one economic sector negatively affects the other sectors and the gross domestic product due to the interdependence and integration among various economic sectors.

This destructive agenda led to a noticeable decline in the overall commercial value of exports and imports to and from the Palestinian territories. Table (2) shows that the total value of Palestinian commercial exports was high before the start of the Intifada in 2000, reaching approximately \$400,857. However, due to the repressive policies and closures enforced by the Israeli occupation on the residents of the West Bank and

Gaza Strip, there was a significant decline in the total value of commercial exports in the years following the beginning of the Palestinian Intifada, especially in 2002, where the value of exports dropped to \$240,867.

Year	Total Value of Imports	Total Value of Exports	Net Trade Balance	Trade Volume
2000	2,382,807	400,857	-1,981,950	2,783,664
2001	2,033,647	290,349	-1,743,298	2,323,996
2002	1,515,608	240,867	1,274,741	1,756,475
2003	1,800,268	279,680	-1,520,588	2,079,948
2004	2,373,248	312,688	-2,060,560	2,685,936
2005	2,667,592	335,443	-2,332,149	3,003,035

Table (2): Value of Imports and Exports (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Monitored Foreign Trade Statistics 2000-2005, State of Palestine, 2022).

From the analysis of the net Palestinian trade balance, it is evident that the trade balance has consistently declined due to the policies implemented by the occupying state towards Palestinian trade activities. At the onset of the Palestinian Intifada in 2000, the trade balance deficit did not exceed -\$1,981,950. However, the deficit began to increase significantly, particularly in 2005, when the trade balance recorded a loss of approximately 25% compared to 2000.




Figure (2): Net Trade Balance

Figure (2) shows that the trade balance deficit decreased by 36% in 2002 compared to 2000. This reduction was due to the Palestinian people’s determination to overcome the restrictions imposed on them during the first and second years of the Intifada. However, the deficit began to rise again after 2002 due to the complete Israeli blockade on Palestinian exports and imports and the inability of Palestinian workers to move between workplaces because of the separation wall, which prevented them from traveling and managing the production process.

Trade exchange was considerably moderate at the beginning of the Palestinian Intifada, but this exchange activity started to decline in 2002 due to Israeli policies that hindered its facilitation. The decline in trade exchange went from 2,783,664 in 2000 to 1,756,475 in 2002, reflecting a 37% decrease.

4.4 The Palestinians determination to overcome the economic crisis

Despite all the losses in the trade balance, the slowdown in trade exchanges, and the increase in unemployment
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among Palestinians, the Palestinian people were determined to break free from the economic dependency on the Israeli state. They adopted a policy of self-reliance to liberate the Palestinian economy gradually. Table (3) highlights the significant changes in agricultural crop production in Palestinian territories during the years of the Palestinian Intifada from 2000-2005.

The Palestinian people achieved agricultural stability and became self-reliant, steadfastly cultivating the land with various field crops such as wheat, barley, corn, and tree crops like olive trees and fruit trees. Figure (3) shows that the Palestinian people were able to maintain the remaining agricultural lands in the West Bank and Gaza Strip despite the occupation authorities placing numerous obstacles to keep Palestinians away from their lands.

Variable	2001/2000	2002/2001	2003/2002	2004/2003	2005/2004
Total Cultivated Area	1,815,547	1,851,070	1,815,019	1,823,670	1.833.350
Fruit Tree Area	1,174,458	1,181,239	1,158,050	1,152,692	1.147.525
Vegetable Area	173,417	174,016	173,595	179.468	179.139
Field Crop Area	467,122	495,297	482,848	491.178	506.686
Cut Flower Area	550	518	526	332	334

Table (3): Major Changes in Agricultural Crop Production in the Palestinian Territories , (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008).

From Table (3), it is evident that the changes in agricultural crop production levels showed slight fluctuations in increase and decrease. This indicates the Palestinian people’s determination to overcome the economic crisis during the years of the Intifada. We see that the total cultivated area decreased slightly after 2002 by 1%, despite all the imposed obstacles. Additionally, the cultivated areas of fruit trees, vegetables, and field crops showed relatively similar percentages of increase and decrease. Notably, the total area cultivated with cut flowers decreased by 39% between 2004 and 2005 due to the occupation’s obstruction of exporting this product abroad.




Figure (3): Amount of Change in Agricultural Crop Production Compared to the Year

Figure (3) shows the percentage change in the production of various crops between 2000 and 2005. The production of fruit trees decreased by 2.5% in 2005 compared to 2000, while the production of vegetables increased by 3.5% in 2005 compared to 2000. Additionally, the production of field crops increased further, reaching 8.5% in 2005 compared to 2000.

By comparing the above data, the rates of increase or decrease in the production of all crops, except

cut flowers, were relatively small. This indicates the determination of the Palestinian people in their efforts to overcome the imposed economic crisis.

4.5 Impact of the Intifada on the Industrial Sector

The Industrial sector in Palestine is one of the main pillars of the Palestinian economy. It has witnessed various fluctuations throughout the historical stages of Palestine, in terms of weakness and strength, affected by the internal conditions imposed on them by the occupying power. In this context, the industrial sector is considered one of the main pillars of the Palestinian economy due to its multiple and prominent contributions to achieving economic and social development. Despite the obstacles and challenges the industrial sector faces, it has flourished recently in developing some sub-industries. This was noticeable in the sector (shoes and leather, textiles, and clothing), which had a positive impact on Palestinian exports (Palestinian Industrial Sector Investment Promotion Agency, 2010, Retrieved from http://www.pipa.ps/ar_page.php?id=26eeedy2551533Y26eed).

Since establishing the Palestinian National Authority in 1994, there has been a growing interest in various traditional industries, including handicrafts such as pottery, glass, pottery, and embroidery. As such, this study looked into various industrial sectors of the Palestine economy including manufacturing, extractive, and food industries. There were various attempts by the National Authority to support the Palestinian national economy by focusing on industry and encouraging investment in this sector. However, the entity has placed all obstacles in the way of the success of this sector.

The outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 led to an apparent decline in various industrial sectors, as it was found that 30% of production plants had stopped working until the beginning of 2002. With the deterioration of the political and security situation in the occupied territories and the repeated Israeli incursions and siege, traditional and non-traditional industrial facilities were exposed to a complete halt in most of their work, similar to the rest of the economic aspects of life in Palestine.

There is a need to identify the most important sectors of the various industries that have been affected since the beginning of the Palestinian uprising.

ii. Traditional Industries

- a. **Pottery Industry:** This industry has flourished in Palestine since the early 20th century, particularly in Hebron. The number of factories increased to 25, with others established in Bethlehem and Al-Bireh. However, most of these factories closed after the outbreak of the 2000 Intifada. Prior, to the Intifada, 30% of production was marketed locally, 30% was exported to Israel, 20% was marketed in Arab countries (especially Jordan), and the remaining 20% was exported to Europe and America (National Information Center in Palestine, Percentages of Traditional Industries in Palestine, State of Palestine,2022).
- b. **Handmade Glass Industry:** Handmade glass production has been known in Palestine since ancient times and was used in various objects used in everyday life, including utensils used to store food and water. Prior to the Intifada, 70% of production was marketed to Israel, 20% was exported to Europe (especially Italy), and 10% was marketed in Arab countries (mainly Jordan) (National Information Center in Palestine, Percentages of Traditional Industries in Palestine, State of Palestine, 2022).
- c. **Leather and Footwear Industry:** The leather and footwear industry in the West Bank has suffered from poor economic conditions since the beginning of 2000 due to the political instability imposed on the West Bank by the Israeli occupation authorities, especially with the coinciding start of the Second Palestinian Intifada. The number of workshops in this sector has declined from 1,000 workshops employing more than 30,000 workers in 2000 to around 230 workshops employing less than 2,500 (National Information Center in Palestine, 2022.).




Figure (4): Percentage Decrease in Traditional Industries during the Intifada Period

From Figure (4), based on the numbers and data previously recorded by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, it is observed that the percentage decreases in traditional industries were significant. For example, the export of ceramic products decreased by 50% during the Palestinian Intifada due to the closure of Israeli, European, and American markets to the products. There was also a notable decline in the hand-blown glass and pottery industry, which fell by 90% during the Palestinian Intifada due to the halt in these exports. A further decrease followed this in the leather and footwear industry, representing a 70% drop in export value.

iii. Extractive Industries

This includes the extraction of stone and marble. However, this sector faced an unprecedented assault by the occupying authorities during the Second Intifada through the imposition of Israeli licensing restrictions and land confiscation. Israel is the primary consumer of Palestinian stone and marble products, accounting for about 65% of sales in this sector, followed by the local market at 20% and the global market at 15%. With the halt in sales to Israel and the global market, the sales percentage dropped to around 80%, which had a direct impact on the Palestinian economy (National Information Center in Palestine, Percentages of Extractive Industries in Palestine, State of Palestine, 2022).

iv. Manufacturing Industries

This includes precious metals, pharmaceuticals, clothing, and coal. This sector faced numerous problems and challenges during the Intifada period, mostly related to the political and economic instability of the time. Key obstacles and problems include:

- ❖ The closure of borders and Palestinian areas by the Israeli occupying authorities had a devastating effect on this sector, in addition to affecting investment opportunities and increasing unemployment rates.
- ❖ Difficulty in obtaining permits to enter Israel to purchase essential raw materials used in the extraction process.
- ❖ The restriction of product sales to Israeli intermediaries imposed additional costs to ensure the delivery of raw materials and the distribution of products (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Manufacturing Industries in Palestine, State of Palestine, 2020).

4.6 The Impact of the Intifada on the Social Aspect

The adverse economic effects that befell the Palestinian people during the events of the Palestinian Intifada reflected adversely on the social conditions of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, leading to an increase in homelessness, family disintegration, and a decline in marriage rates among the youth (Al-

Khuzami 2010, p.71).

Various statistical reports indicate that the siege imposed on the West Bank and Gaza Strip increased the poverty rate among the general Palestinian population (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023), which in turn led to a gradual collapse in the social structure of the general population. Income levels dropped by about 37%, with the individual's income not exceeding \$1.68 per day (Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, 2007).

Due to the closure policy adopted by the occupation authorities, most Palestinians became confined to their residences in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as closures prevented goods from entering. This caused unjustified price increases and a collapse in income (Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, 2007). Moreover, the occupation authorities pursued a policy of social fragmentation by organizing a systematic campaign to arrest family heads, both fathers and mothers, which led to the displacement of defenseless children and the destruction of homes characterized by affection and love. Statistical data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2020) indicated that the policy of arrests began with the start of the second Intifada in 2000 and gradually increased, reaching its peak in 2005.

Thus, this study discovered that the number of arrests by the end of 2000 was around 2,437, which increased significantly to nearly half in 2002. This total includes those arrested from their homes at military checkpoints, those who were forced to surrender under pressure, and those held as hostages. By the end of 2005, the number of arrests had risen dramatically to record levels, reaching 9,072 (Ministry of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs- Palestinian Prisoners Database. Palestinian Authority, 2023).

Year	Number of Arrests During:		Number of Detainees During	
	The first Half of the Year	the Second Half of the Year	End of June	End of December
2000	231	476	2.151	2.437
2001	604	718	2.712	3.076
2002	2,062	1,863	4.679	5.584
2003	1,807	1,563	6.488	6.949
2004	1,982	1,788	7.951	8.624
2005	1,210	1,787	8.297	9.072

Table (4): Number of Palestinian Arrests and Detainees, 2000 – 2005 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Number of Palestinian Arrests and Detainees 2000-2020, State of Palestine,2020).

Despite the arrests carried out by the occupation forces against the Palestinian people, they continued to implement another policy, which is the deliberate, systematic killing of Palestinians to achieve the goal of ethnic cleansing and the elimination of the Palestinian people. Table (5) indicated that the number of martyrs in 2000 was approximately 333, while it nearly tripled in 2002, reaching 1,192 martyrs. The main reason behind the increase in the number of martyrs in 2002 was the occupation state's confiscation of Palestinian lands in the West Bank due to the construction of the separation wall, which deprived them of access to their lands, putting them in direct confrontation with the occupation forces (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Numbers of Martyrs of Al-Aqsa Intifada by Year 2000-2022, State of Palestine, 2022).

Year	Number
2000	333
2001	605
2002	1.192
2003	687
2004	895
2005	261
Total	3973

Table (5): Martyrs of Al-Aqsa Intifada by Year 2000 – 2005 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Numbers of Martyrs of Al-Aqsa Intifada by Year 2000-2022, State of Palestine,2022).

Due to the increase in the number of martyrs during the Palestinian Intifada, the social situation worsened as families lost their primary breadwinner, which is the cornerstone of the Palestinian family. This led to an increase in poverty among Palestinian families, placing additional burdens on Palestinian women beyond their usual responsibilities.

Women had to search for work if they were not already employed, causing them to struggle to meet basic needs and pushing families to the poverty line (Al-Khuzami, 2010, p. 71). According to some studies on Palestinian families that experienced the loss of a breadwinner, economic difficulties were more pronounced when the sole provider of the family was detained. Poverty was more prevalent among families headed by women compared to those headed by men (Bahis, et al, 2009, p. 47).

5. Summary and Discussion of Study Results

The previous historical analytical study relied on the most important sources of knowledge to track the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people between 2000 and 2005, with the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics playing a significant role in reaching the study's key findings.

The study concluded that the second Palestinian Intifada caused an economic and social crisis that significantly damaged the economic structure of the Palestinian people. This led to an increase in unemployment rates among both males and females in various areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip due to the decline in the export of Palestinian products to Israel and various parts of the world.

By mapping the relative relationship and comparison based on the statistical tables, the researcher found the following:

- ❖ Unemployment rates rose unprecedentedly at the peak of Intifada, particularly in 2002, when the unemployment rate reached 27% compared to the first year of the Intifada in 2000. Israeli policies of prevention and closures and not granting permits to Palestinian workers to work inside Israel led to a noticeable relative increase in unemployment.
- ❖ It was also shown that the total trade value of exports and imports to and from Palestinian territories declined significantly at the peak of the Intifada in 2002. The decline in export value reached 159.99 million US dollars compared to the year 2000.
- ❖ Additionally, the Intifada led to a significant decline in traditional industries, with a 50% drop in the export value of ceramics, a 70% drop in the export value of leather and footwear, and a continuous decline in the value of pottery and handmade glass exports, reaching nearly 90%.

The researcher concluded that the negative economic impacts of the Intifada on the Palestinian people also adversely affected the social conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, leading to increased cases of homelessness, family disintegration, and a decline in marriage rates among young people.

Despite these negative impacts, it was found that the Palestinian people attempted to overcome the crisis through self-reliance by increasing the arable land area to sustain their livelihood. The fluctuation in agricultural crop cultivation did not exceed 1%, indicating that the Intifada demonstrated the Palestinian capacity to confront Israeli policies by uniting the people in an effort to break the economic blockade in all Palestinian areas.

On the Israeli side, the Israeli economy was not spared from the negative impacts of the Intifada, with unemployment rates rising to over 9.5% and an economic recession caused by the inability of Palestinian workers to go to Israeli areas to work, leading to the closure of many workshops and productive factories.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization and design, A.A.A., G.F.A., J.M.A. and M.N.A.; Data collection and processing A.A.A., G.F.A.; Data analysis and methodology, A.A.A. and J.M.A.; Writing—original draft, A.A.A., M.N.A.; Writing—review & editing, A.A.A., G.F.A, J. M.A. and M.N.A. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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